(Previous: Eudemian Ethics I.7.)
So then we must look into what the best is, and in how many ways it is said. It seems to exist in three opinions especially. For they say not only that the best of all things is the good itself but also that the good itself has the property of being the foremost of all good things and, through its presence, of being the ground of the other good things - furthermore they say that both of these properties belong to the Idea of the Good. (By "both" I mean being the foremost of the good things and being that which, through its presence, is the ground of the other good things.) For especially the Idea is truly said to be good, since by dint of sharing in the Idea and being similar to it the other things are good, and the Idea is the foremost of the good things. If we eliminated the thing in which other things share we would also eliminate the things that share in the Idea, which are called what they are by sharing in the Idea, since that is the way the foremost thing stands toward what comes after it. Thus the good itself is the Idea of the Good, and as with the other Ideas it is separate from the things that share in it.
Searching through this sort of opinion is a matter for a different study, one which is necessarily more akin to logic (for arguments that proceed by elimination and are generally applicable fall under no other form of understanding). To put the point briefly, first we note that saying there exists an Idea of the Good or of anything else is just empty words. We have already considered this in various ways both in our more popular works and in those devoted to philosophy. Moreover, even if there existed Ideas and an Idea of the Good they would be of no use whatsoever toward the good life and taking action.
The good is said in many ways - the same number of ways as Being is said. For, as covered in other works, Being means what a thing is, how it is, how much, when, and what is undergoing change or bringing about change. And the good falls under each of these: under what a thing is, mind and god; under how a thing is, justice; under how much, due measure; under when, the opportune moment; under change, teaching and being taught. Therefore, just as Being does not have a single identity encompassing all the aforementioned items, so neither does the good, and there is no single form of understanding that encompasses Being or the good. Nor indeed does a single form of understanding give attention to things that are called good because they are similar in manner, such as due measure or the opportune moment, for different forms of understanding give attention to due measure or the opportune moment in different cases. For instance, in nutrition due measure and the opportune moment are matters for medicine and fitness training, whereas the actions of war are matters for generalship, and similarly different forms of understanding for different actions. Thus a single form of understanding could hardly give attention to the good itself.
Moreover, when among however many things you please some come before and some come after, there is not a certain thing that exists beside these as a separate thing, for if there were then there would be something that comes before the first thing. What is common and separate comes before the others because eliminating what is common thereby eliminates what is first. (For example, consider the case of multiplication: if multiplication by two comes first then it's impossible to affirm that some kind of multiplication in common is separate, since that would come before multiplication by two.) Alternatively, if it so happened that the common thing were the Idea, would that make the common thing a separate thing? For they say that if justice is a good thing and courage is a good thing then therefore there exists the good itself, and they assign this "itself" to the common account. But what could that be unless it were what is separate and eternal? Yet what is colored white for many days is not more white than something which is colored white for a single day. Thus the good is no more good by being so eternally, nor is the common good the same as the Idea, for what is common belongs to them all.
The way to establish the good itself is the opposite of how they now establish it; as things stand they establish things that are agreed to be good from things that are not agreed upon: from the goodness of numbers they establish that justice and health are good, seeing that these are numbers and forms of arrangement in the way that the good belongs to numbers and unitary things since the good itself is one. Instead it is necessary to start from things that are agreed upon, such as health, wealth, and moderation, and then establish that the beautiful exists even more in beings that are unchanging. For if the former are forms of arrangement and equilibrium, then the latter are even more so, since these properties belong to them to a greater degree.
Furthermore, it's reckless to spell out the one as the good itself on the grounds that the one is what numbers long for. How they long for it is not stated plainly but is merely stated outright, and how can yearning exist in something which does not have life? They should take more trouble over this and not maintain without an account something that is not easily trusted even with an account. Moreover, it's not true that every existing thing longs for some single good, since each thing yearns for its own characteristic good - the eye for seeing, the body for health, and likewise other things for other goods.
Such are the impasses, with the result that there is no such thing as the good itself. Also it would be useless for statecraft, which has its own characteristic good, as is true for the others (e.g., that of fitness training is being in good shape). Further there is also what's written in the text: for the form of the good itself is either useful to no pursuits or to all alike. Moreover it is not achievable. Similarly, the common good is not the good itself (since even a minor good could be shared in common), nor is it achievable - for medicine troubles itself not with any arbitrary property but with health, and likewise with each of the other crafts. The good takes many forms: one of them is the beautiful, and some of them are achievable and some are not achievable - the sort of good that is achievable is that for the sake of which we act, but this does not exist among beings that are unchanging.
Plainly, then, the Idea of the Good is not the good that we are seeking, nor is it the common good (for the former is unalterable and unachievable, whereas the latter though alterable is unachievable); instead the good that we are seeking is that for the sake of which we act as the highest completion, as the ground of what comes under it, and as the foremost of all good things. Thus this would be the good itself: the highest completion open to human action. And this is the good which comes under that which is decisive over all other goods, which is statecraft and household management and wisdom, for these traits differ from others in this respect (as to whether they differ among themselves, we will speak later on).
That the completion is the ground of the things that come under it is clear from the practice of teaching: having defined what counts as completion they spell out each good under it, since that for the sake of which we act is the ground of these. For example, since being healthy is this, what's beneficial toward being healthy must be that; and what's healthy is the ground of health in the sense of what brings about change, that is, of its being but not of its being good. Furthermore, no one offers a proof that health is a good thing, unless he is not a doctor but a sophist (for they play tricks with arguments that are foreign to the matter at hand), just as is the case with the other starting points.
Thus what brings things to completion is a good for human beings and the highest of the things that are achievable; and since this is the highest we must look into all the ways in which it is the highest of the things that are achievable.
After these preliminaries, let us make a fresh start.
(Cross-posted at Beautiful Wisdom.)
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